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MAIN ISSUES AND THE INTERNATIONAL POLICY CONTEXT
The main objective of this paper is to review the theoretical issues and available
empirical evidence on capital account liberalization. In addition to being of interest
in its own right, capital account liberalizations is important to the debate on the New
International Financial Architecture (NIFA) and to the post-Doha agenda at the World
Trade Organization (WTO) in relation to foreign direct investment (FDI) flows. This
paper focuses on developing countries and it considers policy from the perspective of
(a) economic development and (b) the global rules of the game rather than the eco-
nomic policy within individual countries. The paper essentially examines the ques-
tion: what kind of global economic order in relation to capital flows can best serve the
interests of developing countries?
Capital account liberalization is an area where economic theory is the most dis-
connected from real-world events. In analyzing liberalization of capital flows, it is
customary to distinguish between short-term (for example, portfolio flows and short-
term bank loans) and long-term flows (for example, FDI). Neoclassical theory sug-
gests that free flows of external capital (including short-term capital) should be equili-
brating and help smooth a country’s consumption or production paths. However, in
the real world, exactly the opposite appears to happen. Liberalization of the short-
term capital account has invariably been associated with serious economic and fi-
nancial crises in Asia and Latin America in the 1990s. The proponents of neoclassical
theory argue that the case for free capital flows is no different from that for free
trade; the former could simply be regarded as a form of inter-temporal trade. The
first part of the paper addresses this central controversy in relation to developing
countries and specifically asks the following questions:
•  To what extent, if any, are trade liberalization and free capital flows analogous
in their effects on social welfare? What are the conditions necessary to maximize
their potential net benefits?
• What is the nature of the relationship between capital account liberalization and
economic crises?
• Why do such crises occur far more in developing than in advanced countries?192 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• Do free capital flows lead to faster long-term economic growth, which may com-
pensate for the crisis and the economic instability associated with capital ac-
count liberalization?
• What kind of multilateral framework, if any, would be most appropriate for regu-
lating international capital flows that would best serve the interests of develop-
ing countries?
In the light of the recent deep economic and financial crises in Asia, Latin America
and Russia, many (but by no means all) economists today accept that because short-
term capital flows are often volatile and subject to surges and sudden withdrawals,
these flows could have seriously adverse consequences for developing countries. How-
ever, long-term capital flows, particularly FDI, are regarded as being much more
stable, and for this and other reasons, are thought to have a positive influence on
long-term economic development. It is therefore suggested that when liberalizing
their capital account, developing countries may wish to liberalize only long-term capital
flows such as FDI in the short- to medium-term, while still partially or wholly con-
trolling short-term flows.
Even Joseph Stiglitz, who has been a fierce critic of precipitate capital account
liberalization in developing countries, appears to favor free FDI flows. Thus Stiglitz
finds striking “the zeal with which the International Monetary Fund (IMF) had re-
quested an extension of its mandate to include capital market liberalization a short
two years earlier at the Annual Meetings in Hong Kong. It should have been clear
then, and it is certainly clear now, that the position was maintained either as a mat-
ter of ideology or of special interests, and not on the basis of careful analysis of theory,
historical experience or a wealth of econometric studies. Indeed, it has become in-
creasingly clear that there is not only no case for capital market liberalization, but
that there is a fairly compelling case against full liberalization” [2000, 1076]. Stiglitz,
however, emphasizes that his general strictures against capital account liberaliza-
tion are primarily directed against short-term speculative flows. He writes, “The ar-
gument for foreign direct investment, for instance, is compelling. Such investment
brings with it not only resources, but also technology, access to markets, and (hope-
fully) valuable training, an improvement in human capital. Foreign direct invest-
ment is also not as volatile—and therefore as disruptive—as the short-term flows
that can rush into a country and, just as precipitously, rush out” [ibid., 1076].
This paper takes major issue, with the orthodox laissez-faire position [Summers,
2000; Fischer, 2001], of the desirability of speedy capital account liberalization in
developing countries. It does, however, also part company with Stiglitz in important
respects. I argue that although Stiglitz is right in suggesting that free-trade in capi-
tal is not the same as free trade in goods, he implicitly assigns too much virtue to the
latter. I make this argument more in global economic terms rather than in those of
the traditional concepts, such as infant industry protection. I further suggest that
not only do developing countries need controls against short-term capital flows for
many of the reasons Stiglitz puts forward, but they also require discretion to regu-
late FDI flows if it is thought to be desirable. This paper also argues that free move-
ments of even FDI may contribute to financial fragility in developing economies and
also may not serve the cause of economic development in a number of other ways.193 CAPITAL ACCOUNT LIBERALIZATION
These issues of capital account liberalization are, of course, not only of academic
interest, but clearly of serious policy concern for developing countries. Note that the
present paper concentrates exclusively on the international dimension of the policy
debate on the subject. Orderly and fast progress toward capital account liberaliza-
tion for all countries has been at the heart of the proposals by G7 countries for the
New International Financial Architecture (NIFA). Similarly, the European Union
and Japan have raised the question of the free movements of FDI as an important
subject for study and eventual negotiations at the WTO. Unlike the aborted OECD
Multilateral Agreement on Investment, these new proposals wholly exclude short-
term capital flows and focus entirely on FDI. To date, these proposals have received
little academic or public attention. Now, following the Doha WTO Ministerial Decla-
ration, these issues are on the international agenda and merit urgent scrutiny. There
is already a large literature on the NIFA.1 However, the advanced countries’ pro-
posal for the free movement of FDI has not been studied much. The second half of the
paper redresses this imbalance by focusing on FDI flows, specifically on the proposed
new multilateral agreement on such flows.
To sum up, the main contribution of this paper lies firstly in bringing together
the relevant theory and empirical evidence from diverse areas (theory of interna-
tional trade, of international factor movements, of industrial organization, of finance,
and of economic development) to bear on important international economic policy
issues with respect to both short-term and long-term capital flows to developing coun-
tries. Secondly, the paper examines these multilateral arrangements entirely from a
developing country perspective. Thirdly, it provides analysis and evidence to suggest
that even unfettered FDI, a capital inflow favored by most economists, may not serve
the developmental needs of many countries. Fourthly, the paper provides a critical
analysis of the proposed new multilateral agreement (PMAI) being put forward at
the WTO by some advanced countries. As mentioned above, very little work has been
done on this specific topic before.
FREE TRADE VERSUS FREE CAPITAL MOVEMENTS: ARE THEY
ANALOGOUS?2
Free Trade and Economic Openness: Analytical Considerations
The traditional case for free trade can best be put in terms of the two fundamen-
tal theorems of welfare economics. According to the first welfare theorem, a competi-
tive equilibrium in the absence of externalities and non-satiation constitutes a Pareto
optimum. The second theorem, which is more relevant for present purposes, states
that any Pareto optimum can be realized as a competitive equilibrium in the pres-
ence of all-around convexity, provided suitable lump-sum transfers can be arranged
among the participants. Most of these assumptions are erroneous or are not easily
met in the real world. Nevertheless, neoclassical economists suggest that such con-
siderations do not destroy the case for free trade; they only change the nature of the
argument. Thus, Krugman concludes his classic defense of free trade in terms of
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markets are efficient. Instead it is a sadder but wiser argument for free trade as a
rule of thumb in a world whose politics are as imperfect as its markets” [1987, 143].
However, as Chakravarty and Singh [1988] suggest, the politics of a world of
increasing returns to scale are more likely to gravitate towards managed rather than
free trade. Instead of either free trade or autarchy, this would be a world in be-
tween—a world of trade restrictions, government assistance to favored industries,
and a plethora of special arrangements between countries, in other words, the messy
real world. In place of all-around convexity, this real world is characterized by learn-
ing by doing [Arrow, 1962], dynamic economies and cumulative causation [Young,
1928; Kaldor 1978]. This is, therefore, the world of second best and of multiple equi-
libria. The purpose of policy is to move from a bad to a good equilibrium. The gains
from such policy intervention, however, have to be balanced against the losses from
government failure. Appropriate policy can therefore be prescribed only on a case-by-
case basis [Occampo and Taylor, 2000; Gomery and Baumol, 2000]. Provided a mecha-
nism exists to ensure full employment of each nation’s resources, and if we abstract,
for the moment, from the possibility of government failure, a policy of selective eco-
nomic openness would be a source of great advantage for an economy for any one of
the following reasons:3
(a) it may enable a country to concentrate its relatively specialized resources in ar-
eas of production where the world demand is highly income and price elastic;
(b) it may lead to diffusion of knowledge of a nature which can lead to considerable
upgrading of the quality of local factors of production;
(c) it may lead to sufficient competitive pressure to eliminate X-inefficiency;
(d) trade may lead to changes in the distribution of income which can lead to a greater
share of accumulation in national income;
(e) trade may facilitate what Schumpeter stressed so much: an accelerated process
of creative destruction.
In general, trade openness works positively if the phenomenon of “learning” from
contacts with the rest of the world is institutionalized through suitable adaptations
on the policy side involving appropriate government interventions which make the
domestic economy more responsive to change. This is a main lesson that emerges
from the outstanding industrial success of East Asian economies during the second
half of the 20th century.4 Countries such as Japan and Korea established comprehen-
sive technology and industrial policies to institutionalize such learning. It is impor-
tant to appreciate that although Japan and Korea were “trade open” in the sense of
being export or outward oriented, they were not so open on the side of imports. Both
countries maintained, formally or informally, selective import controls for long peri-
ods during the course of their industrialization. The strategic interests of the U.S.
hegemony permitted such selective openness without threatening retaliation.5 To
pursue these policies of selective economic openness, it is necessary for developing
countries to have not only appropriate institutions to minimize the incidence of gov-
ernment failure, but also a world conjuncture that permits them to pursue commer-
cial and industrial policies on a non-reciprocal basis that best suits their develop-
mental requirements. Chakravarty and Singh [1988] point out that in such a world,195 CAPITAL ACCOUNT LIBERALIZATION
selective economic openness may be a superior strategy than either free trade or
autarchy. They also suggest that at a theoretical level, learning over time is a more
relevant paradigm for developmental gains from trade than the neoclassical story
that emphasizes the exploitation of arbitrage opportunities.6
To sum up, while the classical and neoclassical arguments for free trade suffer
from serious conceptual and operational difficulties, selective trade or economic open-
ness have substantive benefits that are more robust than the traditional neoclassical
theory suggests. Such benefits can be realized, however, only in a world conjuncture
in which full employment and other structural conditions outlined above are met,
coupled with an appropriate set of domestic policies that go considerably beyond the
limits of commercial policy as traditionally defined.
The Case for Capital Account Liberalization
The case for capital account liberalization was authoritatively put forward by
Stanley Fischer, the former Deputy Managing Director of the International Mon-
etary Fund, in the following terms:
• that the benefits of liberalizing the capital account outweigh the potential costs;
• that countries need to prepare well for capital account liberalization: economic
policies and institutions, particularly the financial system, need to be adapted to
operate in a world of liberalized capital markets; and
• that an amendment of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement is the best way of ensur-
ing that capital account liberalization is carried out in an orderly, non-disruptive
way, that minimizes the risks that premature liberalization could pose for an
economy and its policymakers. [1997]
Fischer suggests that, at a theoretical level, capital account liberalization would
lead to global economic efficiency, allocation of world savings to those who are able to
use them most productively, and would thereby increase social welfare. Citizens of
countries with free capital movements would be able to diversify their portfolios and
thereby increase their risk-adjusted rates of return. It would enable corporations in
these countries to raise capital in international markets at a lower cost. It is sug-
gested, moreover, that such liberalization leads to further development of a country’s
financial system, which in turn is thought to enhance productivity in the real economy
by facilitating transactions and by better allocating resources. Some argue that free
capital movements will help increase world welfare through another channel, namely
transferring resources from aging populations and lower rates of return in advanced
countries to younger populations and higher rates of return in newly industrializing
economies. Such resource transfers will be Pareto optimal as both rich and poor coun-
tries would gain.
Summers succinctly sums up the core point of the orthodox perspective as fol-
lows: “… the abstract argument for a competitive financial system parallels the ar-
gument for competitive markets in general … Just as trade in goods across jurisdic-
tions has benefits, so too will intertemporal trade and trade that shares risks across
jurisdictions have benefits” [2000, 2].196 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
Orthodox economists recognize that capital account liberalization has risks. Mar-
kets sometimes overreact or react late or react too fast. However, Fischer argues that
“…capital movements are mostly appropriate: currency crises do not blow up out of a
clear blue sky, but rather start as rational reactions to policy mistakes or external
shocks. The problem is that once started, they may sometimes go too far” [1997, 4-5].
In general, Fisher believes that capital markets serve as an important discipline for
government macroeconomic policy “which improves overall economic performance
by rewarding good policies and penalizing bad.” [ibid., 4]
 Two initial observations may be made with respect to this orthodox case for
capital account liberalization. The first is that not all orthodox economists favor such
liberalization. Bhagwati [1998] for example, a leading theorist and advocate of free
trade in goods and services, regards capital account liberalization as inappropriate
for developing countries. Secondly, as with the case of the neoclassical argument for
free trade, the maintenance of full employment and macroeconomic stability consti-
tute an important prerequisite for reaping the benefits of a globalized capital mar-
ket. Specifically, as Rakshit [2001] suggests, the theoretical model of the beneficial
effects of free capital movements makes the following assumptions:
(a) resources are fully employed everywhere;
(b) capital flows themselves do not stand in the way of attaining full employment or
macroeconomic stability; and
(c) the transfer of capital from one country to another is governed by long-term re-
turns on investment in different countries.
The validity of these assumptions under the current global economic regime is
examined below.
The Analytical Case Against Free Capital Flows
The theoretical case against the view that unfettered capital movements are es-
sential for maximizing the gains from trade and world economic welfare has been
made by a number of economists from different schools of thought. First within the
neoclassical tradition itself, Stiglitz [2000] argues that the concept of free movements
of capital is fundamentally different from that of free trade in goods. Capital flows
are subject to asymmetric information, agency problems, adverse selection, and moral
hazard. Although such problems may occur also in trade in goods and services, they
are intrinsic to financial flows and are far more significant.
Importantly, there are also diverging views about the price formation process in
asset markets such as the stock market and the currency markets. Orthodox econo-
mists subscribe to the theory of efficient markets. In this view, prices are a collective
outcome of actions of a multitude of individual economic agents whose behavior is
assumed to be based on utility maximization and rational expectations. This price
formation process is thought to lead to efficient prices in these markets. A powerful
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and encapsulated in his well-known “beauty contest” analogy, which highlights the
role of speculation in determining prices.
Thus, in Keynesian analysis, which has been formalized in recent theoretical
contributions, price formation in asset markets may often be dominated by specula-
tors or, in modern parlance, noise traders. Moreover, theoretical work on Darwinian
selection mechanisms indicate that the Friedman [1953] assertion that rational in-
vestors will always wipe out speculators is far from being valid in all situations.7
Further the critical school emphasizes that financial markets are particularly
prone to coordination failures and often generate multiple equilibria, some of which
are good and some of which are bad. In the absence of appropriate coordination by
the government or international authorities, an economy may languish in a low-level
equilibrium, producing suboptimal output and employment levels.
The post-Keynesian economists [see for example, Davidson, 2001], take a more
radical stance. They put forward analyses and evidence in favor of Keynes’ thesis
“that flexible exchange rates and free international capital mobility are incompatible
with global full employment and rapid economic growth in an era of multilateral free
trade” [ibid., 12]. These economists also challenge the orthodox presumption that
transparency and availability of more information would make the financial mar-
kets less prone to crisis. They point out that the crises are fundamentally due to the
fact that the future is uncertain and people have different perceptions about it.
Keynes was very skeptical about the ability of the world economy under free
trade and free capital movements to maintain balance of payments equilibrium be-
tween countries at full employment levels of output. In a famous passage he ob-
served, “… the problem of maintaining equilibrium in the balance of payments be-
tween countries has never been solved … the failure to solve the problem has been a
major cause of impoverishment and social discontent and even of wars and revolu-
tions … to suppose that there exists some smoothly functioning automatic mecha-
nism of adjustment which preserves equilibrium only if we trust to matters of laissez
faire is a doctrinaire delusion which disregards the lessons of historical experience
without having behind it the support of sound theory” [Moggridge, 1980, 21-2]. Con-
sequently the Keynesian design for the postwar international financial system did
not envisage free capital movements.
In summary, the orthodox theory that financial liberalization leads to global eco-
nomic efficiency based on the analogy with free trade is flawed on several counts,
including some within the neoclassical tradition itself.
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION AND
ECONOMIC CRISIS
Banking and Currency Crises and the Real Economy
The theoretical expectation that free capital movements lead to smoother income
and consumption trajectories for individuals and countries following economic shocks
than would otherwise be the case, has been confounded by the experience of develop-
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alization of the financial system and economic and financial crises particularly in
developing countries. Developed countries, including the United States, the UK and
Scandinavian countries, have also been subject to such crises, but compared with
developing countries, the incidence has been relatively low and the social costs corre-
spondingly smaller. However, developing countries have suffered not only more but
also deeper crises and virtual financial meltdowns.
Compared to this impressionistic evidence, the results of detailed econometric
studies are more mixed. The empirical literature on this subject is vast and still
growing at a fast rate. At least four kinds of studies are relevant. First, contributions
to the financial literature support the orthodox case that financial liberalization in
emerging markets reduces the cost of equity capital and has a positive impact on
domestic investments. [Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad, 2001; Henry 2000; Chari
and Henry, 2002]. Secondly, studies on financial liberalization, banking, and cur-
rency crisis find that there is a close causal relationship between these variables,
thus providing support for the anti-liberalization camp. Some of these studies will be
reviewed below. A third strand of this literature concerns financial crashes and sug-
gest that financial liberalization is much more risky in this respect for developing
than for advanced countries. Leading contributions in this area are Martin and Rey
[2002]. Wyplosz [2001], Mendoza [2001], McKinnon and Pill [1999]. The fourth part
of this literature considers the relationship between capital account liberalization
and long-term economic growth.
It is not our purpose here to systematically review this whole body of literature
but rather to draw relevant conclusions for a multilateral global framework for short-
and long-term capital flows from a developing country perspective. However, in or-
der to indicate the nature and the kind of evidence produced by these studies, a few of
them will be briefly examined below.
Kaminsky and Reinhart’s [1999] paper explored the links between banking cri-
ses, exchange rate crises, and financial liberalization. The sample covered 1970 to
1995 and consisted of twenty countries, fourteen of which were developing. The au-
thors found that both types of crises increased sharply since 1980. The average num-
ber of banking crises in their sample rose from 0.3 per year from 1970 to 1979 to 1.4
per year from 1980 to 1995. The two authors found that the banking crises and the
currency crises are closely related and that the banking crises are often preceded by
financial liberalization.
In their influential study Demigüc-Kunt and Detragiache [1998] examined bank-
ing crises from 1980 to 1984 for a sample of 53 developed and developing countries.
They found that a banking crisis is more likely to occur where the financial system
has been liberalized. They also found a two-way interaction between banking and
currency crises. Where the banking systems are not sufficiently developed, with capi-
tal account liberalization, banks become vulnerable to external economic shocks. The
authors’ findings suggest that vulnerability is reduced with institutional develop-
ment and strengthening of the banking system through prudential regulation. They
also found that financial liberalization leads to an intensification of competition among
banks and hence to greater moral hazard and risk-taking than before.8199 CAPITAL ACCOUNT LIBERALIZATION
The recent Asian crisis provides almost a laboratory experiment for examining
the role of capital account liberalization in causing or exacerbating that region’s se-
vere economic downturn. Williamson and Drabek [1998] provide evidence to suggest
that countries that did or did not have economic crises were differentiated only by
whether or not they had liberalized their capital accounts. Most economists would
now agree that even if premature financial liberalization without adequate pruden-
tial regulation was not the root cause of the crises in countries such as Thailand,
Korea, and Indonesia, it greatly contributed to the occurrence and depth of the cri-
ses. Indeed, the economic fundamentals prior to the crises of the affected countries
were better than those of India, but the latter country was spared the crisis because
of its control over the capital account. Similarly, China managed to avoid a crisis and
continued to have fast economic growth. China also had not liberalized its capital
account.9
It is argued by some that even with the acute economic crisis of 1998-1999, over
the long run Korea, with its economic openness, was a much more successful economy
than India. This argument has some plausibility but overlooks the crucial fact that
Korea’s outstanding industrialization record over the previous three decades was not
accomplished by a liberalized financial system but rather by a highly controlled one.
However, when the system was liberalized in the 1990s it was followed by an unprec-
edented crisis [Demetriades and Luintel, 2001].
Social and Economic Costs of the Crisis
The Asian crisis was extremely important in terms of its economic and social
impact on the populations of the affected countries. The World Bank notes that “In
terms of lost output and the implications for poverty and unemployment, the Asian
crisis represents one of the most acute periods of financial instability in this century”
[2001, 73]. The crisis greatly increased poverty, reduced employment and real wages,
and caused enormous social distress. Indeed the economic downturn was so enor-
mous that in a country like Indonesia the social fabric of the country virtually disin-
tegrated. This is why the Asian crisis is aptly termed, not just an ordinary slowing of
GDP growth due to an economic shock or a normal cyclical recession, but an enor-
mous meltdown. It is important to appreciate, however, that even if no meltdown
occurs, economic slowdowns or recessions have bigger social costs in developing than
developed countries because of their lack of publicly provided social security. There is
evidence that in both country groups the effects of a downturn fall disproportionately
on the poor and on women [Singh and Zammit, 2000; Stiglitz, 1999; World Bank,
1998/99].
Turning to an investigation of purely economic costs, there are good analytical
reasons to believe that economic crises would negatively affect both investment and
long-term growth [Pindyck, 1991; World Bank [2001]; Easterly et al., 2000]. In addi-
tion, recessions and meltdowns also have fiscal and redistributive implications that
may affect the economy for a long period of time. Caprio and Klingebiel [1996] esti-
mates indicate that the costs of a banking crisis are typically quite large, ranging
from 3.2 percent of GDP in the 1984-91 U.S. savings and loans crisis to 55.3 percent200 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
for the 1980-82 Argentinian banking crisis (Table 1). On the basis of more recent
evidence, Aizenman [2002] estimates the average cost of a currency crisis to be 8
percent of the pre-crisis GDP and the average cost of a simultaneous banking and
currency crisis is 18 percent of pre-crisis GDP. He also reports that “the twin crises
are mainly concentrated in financially liberalized emerging market economies” [ibid.,
5].
In a pioneering study Easterly et al. [2000] investigated economic instability for
a large cross-section of developed and developing countries from 1960 to 1990. As
Table 2 indicates, developing countries typically suffer greater instability than de-
veloped countries with respect to output, employment, real wages, capital flows and
terms of trade changes.10 In neoclassical analysis it is customary to attribute insta-
bility to the lack of flexibility in labor markets, particularly to wage rigidity. How-
ever, Easterly et al. find that despite greater labor market flexibility (measured by
changes in real wages) in developing countries, wages are also more volatile than
developed countries (Table 2). The authors’ results suggest that the characteristics of
the financial system rather than the labor market are the more important causes of
economic instability.11 Their econometric analysis shows that financial variables are
statistically significant in explaining both volatility of GDP growth and the likeli-
hood of a downturn. They find that openness and policy volatility also have a signifi-
cant influence on growth volatility. In general, the findings of Easterly et al. suggest
that countries with weak financial systems display greater instability in GDP growth
in part because these institutional shortcomings amplify the effects of the volatility
of capital flows.
TABLE 1
Fiscal Costs of Banking Crisis in Selected Countries
(percentage of GDP)













Sri Lanka 1989-93 5.0
Malaysia 1985-8 4.7
Norway 1987-89 4.0
United States 1984-91 3.2
Source: Caprio and Klingebiel 1996. Quoted in Chang, (2001)201 CAPITAL ACCOUNT LIBERALIZATION
Capital Account Liberalization and Proximate Causes of Instability
The fundamental theoretical reasons why capital account liberalization may lead
to economic instability were analyzed earlier. The present subsection briefly reviews
some of the proximate reasons for this instability in developing countries, namely:
(a) Self-fulfilling expectations;
(b) volatility in capital flows;
(c) Increased competition among banks following liberalization as mentioned above;
(d) The changes in the global financial system and the short-termism of the leading
players.
Self-fulfilling expectations. A large literature based on the self-fulfilling ex-
pectations suggests that capital account liberalization is much more likely to lead to
financial crisis in emerging markets than in developed countries. This literature points
to the role of factors such us moral hazard, credit constraints and overborrowing
syndrome as factors to explain these different outcomes. Martin and Rey [2002), an
TABLE 2
Economic Instability and Related Variables:
Differences between Developing and High-Income OECD Countries
Developing Countries High-income OECD Countries
t-Statistic for
Number of Number of difference
Variable Mean observations Mean observations in  means  P-value
Growth 0.007 163 0.027 23 -5.659  0.000
Standard deviation
   of growth 0.061 163 0.026 23 9.779 0.000
Median standard
  deviation of growth 0.052 0.022
Standard deviation
   of employment 0.098 83 0.035 21 6.652 0.000
Standard deviation
   of real wage index 2.119 90 1.883 21 0.833 0.410
Standard deviation
   of real wage changes 1.197 85 0.321 21 8.116 0.000
Private capital
  flows / GDP 1.722 146 0.372 22 2.743 0.009
Standard deviation
  of private capital
  flows / GDP 2.662 138 2.311 22 0.808 0.420
Standard deviation
   of terms of trade
   changes 0.123 117 0.041 23 9.688 0.000
Standard deviation
   of money growth 0.219 148 0.077 20 6.757 0.000
Source: Easterly, W, Islam, R. and Stiglitz, J.E. [2000].202 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
important contribution to these studies, provide empirical evidence that after liber-
alization the probability of a financial crisis is negatively related to per capita in-
come, whereas before liberalization these variables are only weakly related. The au-
thors report that the results are robust to alternative definitions of financial crash.
Their model of self-fulfilling expectations does not require any appeal to special fac-
tors mentioned above to explain these empirical facts. Rather, in their model, for
intermediate levels of international financial transactions costs, pessimistic expecta-
tions can be self-fulfilling leading to a financial crash. The crash is accompanied by
capital flight, a drop in income below the financial autarchy level, and market incom-
pleteness.
Volatility. The volatility and the procyclical nature of private capital flows to
developing countries is a well-attested feature of international capital movements
during the last two decades [Williamson, 2002; Occampo, 2001; Singh and Zammit,
2000; Stiglitz, 2000]. Such inflows come in surges, often bearing no relationship to
the economic fundamentals of the country, and leave the country when they are most
needed; that is in a downturn. As Williamson and Drabek [1998] note, even in a
country such as Chile which was deeply integrated with the world financial markets,
private foreign capital suddenly withdrew in the event of a fall in copper prices. There
is, however, an important debate on the comparative volatility of the different com-
ponents of capital flows, which will be reviewed in the following sections.
Ramey and Ramey [1995] found that the effects of the volatility of capital flows
was positively related to volatility of GDP growth, a result confirmed by Easterly et
al. [2000]. The former two authors also reported a negative relationship between
long-run economic growth and the volatility of GDP growth, a result again confirmed
by Easterly et al. [2000], and also by World Bank [2001], among others. Table 3, from
the latter publication, presents regression results of the effects of capital flows and
their volatility on growth per capita, for a large sample of developing countries over
successive decades, covering the 1970-1998 period. The table also contains the nor-
mal control variables used in such cross-section analyses (for example, initial GDP
per capita, initial schooling, population growth rate, investment rates, and a mea-
sure of policy). Volatility of capital flows is measured by the standard deviation of the
flows. The dependent variable is the rate of growth of GDP per capita. The table
suggests an economically important and statistically significant negative relation-
ship between capital flow volatility and GDP growth per capita for the 1970-1998
period as a whole.12 It is interesting, however, that the negative relationship becomes
weaker over time, with the value of the relevant coefficient rising from a statistically
significant minus .322 during 1970-79 to minus .124 in 1990-98 when the coefficient
was also statistically insignificant. Other results from Table 3 will be commented on
in the following section.
The next issue is why the capital flows to developing countries are so volatile.
Analysis and evidence suggests that both internal (for example, weak domestic fi-
nancial systems, and frequent economic shocks) and external factors, particularly
the animal spirits of foreign investors, are involved in making these flows volatile.
Kindleberger [1984] has observed that financial markets are subject to frequent
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and pessimism of investors largely unrelated to fundamentals. Importantly,
Kindleberger’s historical analysis is implicitly endorsed by Alan Greenspan, the Chair-
man of the U.S. Federal Reserve himself, who recently commented on the 1987 U.S.
stock market crash and the Asian financial meltdown of the 1990s:
At one point the economic system appears stable, the next it behaves
as though a dam has reached a breaking point, and water (read, con-
fidence) evacuates its reservoir. The United States experienced such
a sudden change with the decline in stock prices of more than 20
percent on October 19, 1987. There is no credible scenario that can
readily explain so abrupt a change in the fundamentals of long-term
valuation on that one day. ... But why do these events seem to erupt
without some readily evident precursors? Certainly, the more extended
the risk-taking, or more generally, the lower the discount factors ap-
plied to future outcomes, the more vulnerable are markets to a shock
that abruptly triggers a revision in expectations and sets off a vicious
cycle of contraction. ... Episodes of vicious cycles cannot easily be fore-
cast, as our recent experience with Asia has demonstrated. [1998, 4-5]
This mirrors the Keynesian view of investor behavior and the significance of mass
psychology in price formation in the financial markets, as discussed earlier. Keynes’
insights on this subject have been formalized in current theoretical literature, which
is able to provide a “rational” explanation for the herdlike behavior, contagion and
other irrational manifestations of economic agents in financial markets [Shiller, 2000;
Singh and Weisse, 1999; Singh, 1999].
TABLE 3
Effects of Capital Flows and Their Volatility on
Growth per Capita by Decade.
Dependent Variable: Rate of GDP Growth per Capita
Independent variable 1970-98 1970-80 1980-89 1990-98
Capital flows 0.287b 0.149 0.133 0.275b
Capital flows volatility 0.344b 0.322b 0.188 0.124
Initial GDP per capital 0.508b 0.345 0.940b 0.159
Initial schooling 1.429 1.749 3.640a 0.446
Population growth rate 0.513b 0.438 0.573b 0.869b
Investment 0.182b 0.309b 0.164b 0.094b
Policy 0.008b 0.007b 0.011b 0.013b
Inflation rate 0.002b 0.008 -0.001b 0.004b
Openness of the
     economy 0.001 0.006 0.001 -0.024b
Adjusted R2 0.75 0.59 0.57 0.38
No. of Countries. 72 56 74 100
a. Significant at the 10 percent level
b. Significant at the 5 percent level.
Source: World Bank [2001].204 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
It is also important to emphasize another major factor in causing the volatility of
external capital flows to developing countries. Kaufman [2000] and Williamson [2002]
have stressed the significance of changes in the nature and character of the financial
markets in enhancing capital flow volatility. The intense competition in the world
fund management industry together with the nature of rewards offered to fund man-
agers have helped to make fund managers focus on the short run when making their
investment decisions.13 As Kauffman notes:
In the new global financial system, most prominent banks, securities
firms, and even a few insurance companies possess departments that
emulate the trading and investment approach of the hedge funds.
Even the corporate treasuries of a number of non-financial corpora-
tions are engaged in this activity. Once arcane and exotic, the hedge
fund approach to investment has been mainstreamed. [2000, 61]
Finally, analysis and evidence for increased competition among banks following
liberalization is provided by Furman and Stiglitz [1999] and Stiglitz [2000] among
others.
EVIDENCE ON CAPITAL ACCOUNT LIBERALIZATION AND LONG-
TERM ECONOMIC GROWTH
In principle it is possible for the instability caused by capital account liberaliza-
tion to be more than compensated for by faster long-term economic growth arising
from the greater availability of capital inflows. This is the promise held by the propo-
nents of this policy regime [Fischer, 1997; Summers, 2000]. It will therefore be useful
to review the available empirical evidence on this issue.
A good starting point is the broad brush approach adopted by Singh [1997a] in
analyzing this issue. He considers the case of advanced countries whose experience,
he suggests, is relevant for developing economies. This is because the former have
operated under a regime of relatively free trade and capital movements for nearly
two decades—a period long enough to make at least a preliminary assessment of the
effects of this economic regime on performance. Evidence suggests that the record
has been less than impressive despite the fact that the world economy during this
period has not been subject to any abnormal negative shocks like the oil price in-
creases of 1973 and 1979. Indeed, the economic performance of industrial countries
during this later period has been much worse than in the earlier period of the 1950s
and 1960s when they functioned under a myriad of capital controls.
• GDP growth in the 1980s and 1990s under a liberal regime regarding private
capital flows was much lower than that achieved in the “illiberal” and regulated
“golden age” of the 1950s and 1960s;
• Productivity growth in the last fifteen years has been half of what it was in the
“golden age”;
• The critical failure is, however, with respect to employment: 8 million people
were unemployed in the OECD countries in 1970, but by the mid 1990s 35 mil-
lion were unemployed, that is, 10 percent of the labor force.205 CAPITAL ACCOUNT LIBERALIZATION
Singh’s analysis also shows that the poor performance of industrialized countries
during the 1980s and 1990s cannot alternatively be ascribed to exogenous factors
such as the exhaustion of technological opportunities, or to labor market imperfec-
tions. Industrial economies have more flexible markets today than they did in the
golden age. In addition they have the benefit of a new technological paradigm of
information and communication technology which many economic historians regard
as on a par with the most important technological revolutions of the last two centu-
ries. In view of all these factors—a new technological paradigm, more flexible mar-
kets, absence of economic shocks such as the oil shocks of 1973 and 1975—orthodox
analyses would suggest that OECD economies should be growing today at a much
faster rate than in the golden age. But as we see the opposite has been true.
Eatwell’s [1996] and Singh’s [1997a] analyses indicate that the poor performance
of industrial countries in the recent period is closely linked to intrinsic features of the
liberal financial regime. Coordination failures have led to suboptimal levels of the
OECD and world aggregate demand, output and employment. When capital flows
were regulated in the 1950s and 1960s, and there was successful coordination under
the hegemony of the United States, balance of payments between countries was
achieved at much higher levels of output and employment than has subsequently
been the case under financial liberalization.
In contrast with the above broad brush approach, there exist numerous econo-
metric studies of the effects of capital account liberalization on economic growth with
definitely mixed results. Loungani recently reviewed the IMF contributions on the
subject and reached the following conclusion:
…..What impact do capital flows have on growth? The evidence is
decidedly mixed and appears to depend, somewhat, on the particular
flow studied (or the measure of capital market openness used), the
sample period, the set of countries, and whether cross-section or panel
data is used. Recent IMF work provides an illustration of mixed find-
ings. In a much-cited study, Borensztein, De Gregorio, and Lee [1998]
find that FDI increases economic growth when the level of education
in the host country-a measure of its absorptive capacity- is high. Mody
and Murshid [2002] find that capital inflows boost domestic invest-
ment almost one-to-one, but the strength of this relationship appears
to be weakening over time. In contrast, Edison, Levine, Ricci, and
Slok [2002], using the new measures of openness, do not find evi-
dence of a robust link between international financial integration and
economic growth. [2002, 6]
Two main conclusions emerge from the above review of empirical evidence on
capital account liberalization, financial crisis, and GDP growth. First, there is strong
evidence of a close relationship between liberalization and economic and financial
crises in developing countries. This relationship is robust, and in the circumstances
of these countries there are also strong analytical arguments for both its existence
and robustness. Secondly, available evidence for the view that free capital flows pro-
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Aizenman reaches a broadly similar conclusion: “…..there is solid evidence that fi-
nancial opening increases the chance of financial crisis. There is more tenuous evi-
dence that financial opening contributes positively to long-run growth” [2002, 2] How-
ever, from the perspective of economic policy an important consideration is how to
proceed from the short to the long term. The economic crises, and the instability that
capital account liberalization is seen to generate in the short term, may compromise
a country’s future economic development by inducing capital flight and lowering do-
mestic investment and long-term economic growth. In summary, in view of these
facts and analyses, Stiglitz [2000] is fully justified in castigating the IMF for promot-
ing universal capital account liberalization when most developing countries were not
ready for such policies. Fortunately, in the wake of the Asian crisis the IMF has in
the most recent period moderated its stance in this respect.
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As explained in the introduction, while Stiglitz finds a “compelling” case against
any general liberalization of the capital account, he also suggests that there is a
“compelling” case in favor of FDI. In view of the fickleness of the short-term capital
flows and the gyrations of the markets, he comprehensively rejects the argument
that capital account liberalization is desirable because it imposes discipline on coun-
tries by forcing them to follow good economic policy. However, he states that “far
more relevant for the long run success of the economy is the foreign direct invest-
ment and the desire to acquire and sustain FDI provide strong discipline on the
economy and the political process “ [ibid., 1080]. Although he does not specifically
address this issue, Stiglitz comes close to accepting the principles of the new proposal
that is being put forward by the EU and Japan at the WTO for a multilateral agree-
ment on investment (hereafter PMAI), covering only FDI. The background to this
proposal is as follows. Three years ago the OECD countries failed to negotiate a
Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) among themselves, which was intended
to be acceded to later by developing countries. PMAI is similar to MAI with the criti-
cal difference that, unlike the latter, the former will only be confined to FDI. This
clearly represents a significant concession to developing countries. The advanced
countries’ preference would seem to be to establish a binding treaty at the WTO that
would create a regime for FDI similar to that of (free) trade in goods. Since this
agreement would be based on WTO’s basic concepts, previous history suggests that it
is likely to include the following kinds of elements:
• the right of establishment for foreign investors (the concept of market access);
• the principle of most-favored nation treatment;
• the principle of national treatment;
• investment protection, including matters relating to expropriation and the transfer
of capital;
• additional disciplines relating to, among other matters, entry, stay, and work of
key personnel;
• prohibition of performance requirements on foreign investors;207 CAPITAL ACCOUNT LIBERALIZATION
• rules on investment incentives;
• binding rules for settling disputes through the WTO dispute settlements mecha-
nism.15
In favoring FDI Stiglitz seems to be a part of a general consensus among econo-
mists that suggests that compared with debt and portfolio investment, FDI, apart
from its other merits, is the safest source of funds for developing countries. It neither
adds to a country’s debt, nor (being bricks and mortar) can it be quickly withdrawn
from the country. Further, in view of the other virtues of FDI in bringing new tech-
nology, organizational methods, and, importantly, spillovers to domestic industry,
its proponents claim that the case for PMAI becomes overwhelming.
Those propositions will be contested below and it will be argued that unfettered
FDI is not in the best interests of many developing countries. As with short-term
flows, FDI also requires appropriate regulation by these countries to enhance social
welfare. Because such measures would be denied by PMAI, poor countries should
resist the proposed agreement.
I begin this analysis by noting that developing countries’ perspective on, and
attitude towards, FDI has changed. In the 1950s and 1960s, developing countries
were often hostile towards multinational investment and sought to control multina-
tional companies’ activities through domestic and international regulations. During
the last two decades, however, emerging countries have been falling over themselves
to attract as much multinational investment as possible.
This enormous shift in developing countries’ stance toward multinational invest-
ment is associated with major changes that have occurred in the pattern of interna-
tional capital flows to developing counties. The former may be regarded as both a
cause and a consequence of the latter. The most important change in capital flows for
the purpose of this paper is the emergence of FDI as a predominant source of exter-
nal finance for developing countries during the 1990s. Between 1996 and 1998 FDI
inflows to developing countries constituted about 10 percent of their gross capital
formation. [Singh, 2001; UNCTAD, 2001]. It is also important to note that alongside
these changes in the pattern of external finance, analysis and evidence suggest that
developing countries’ need for external finance has greatly increased. This is in part
due to the liberalization of trade and capital flows in the international economy.
UNCTAD [2000] suggests that because of these structural factors, developing coun-
tries have become more balance-of-payments constrained than before: the constraint
begins to bite at a much slower growth rate than was the case previously in the 1970s
and 1980s.
In these circumstances it is not surprising that developing countries have radi-
cally changed their attitude towards FDI. These counties, therefore, have competed
intensely to attract FDI. This competition has resulted in a shift in the balance of
power towards multinationals. An important objection to PMAI is that if approved, it
would worsen this imbalance because the Agreement would essentially give the mul-
tinationals a license to (or not to) invest wherever or whenever they like regardless of
the circumstance and needs of developing countries.208 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
FDI AND FINANCIAL FRAGILITY
Leaving aside other characteristics of FDI (to be discussed later), we will con-
sider it first simply as a source of finance, and examine its implications for balance of
payments and macroeconomic management of the economy. In contrast to portfolio
investments, FDI, because it involves normally a stake of 10 percent or more in a
host country enterprise together with managerial control, is by definition supposed
to reflect a long-term commitment.18 The presumption is that the inflow of foreign
capital in this form will be more stable than portfolio investments, which investors
can easily liquidate following an internal or external shock.
There are, however, important arguments to suggest that the presumption of
stability in net FDI inflows may not be correct. First, the distinction between FDI
and portfolio investment has become much weaker with the growth of derivatives
and hedge funds. As Claessens et al., [1995] observe, even at an elementary level it is
easy to see how a long-term “bricks and mortar” investment can be converted into a
readily liquid asset. They note that a direct investor can use his/her immovable as-
sets to borrow in order to export capital and thereby generate rapid capital outflows.
Another reason why FDI may be volatile is because a large part of a country’s
measured FDI according to the IMF balance of payments conventions usually con-
sists of retained profits. Profits are affected by the business cycle, and therefore dis-
play considerable volatility. This also prevents FDI from being countercyclical and
stabilizing unless the host and home country economic cycles are out of phase with
each other. That may or may not happen.
Further, there is evidence that, like other sources of finance, FDI flows can also
surge at times. Apart from their contribution to volatility, these FDI surges, just like
portfolio investment, can lead to equally undesirable consequences such as exchange
rate appreciation and reduced competitiveness of a country’s tradable sector.
Claessens et al. [1995] concluded that time series properties of the different forms
of capital flows including FDI did not statistically differ and that long-term flows
were often as volatile as short- term flows. Williamson [2002] has suggested that this
study may have failed to find differences between flows because it measured volatil-
ity in terms of the second moments of the time series instead of the ones of a higher
order. The latter are relevant with respect to occasional meltdowns, which occurred
for example in the Asian crisis. UNCTAD’s 1998 study of the stability of capital flows
between 1992 and 1997 found that FDI was relatively more stable than portfolio
flows, with important exceptions including Brazil, South Korea, and Taiwan.17 Lipsey
[2001] also concluded that the FDI flows were relatively more stable overall.
In favor of the FDI-stability thesis, it has been argued that during the Asian
crisis and its aftermath, while bank lending and portfolio flows were sharply re-
versed, FDI continued much as before. However the motivation for this could have
been what Krugman called the “fire-sale” of devalued assets as a result of the crisis.
Evidence, however, seems to suggest that it is more likely that the relative stability
of FDI is due in part to the fact that the governments abolished regulations prevent-
ing or limiting FDI in domestic enterprises (albeit under IMF conditionality in the
affected countries). Multinationals have used this opportunity to increase their hold-
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Even if FDI is somewhat less volatile than other flows other important implica-
tions of FDI for a host country’s balance of payments need to be considered. These
derive from the fact that an FDI investment creates foreign exchange liabilities not
only now but also into the future. This characteristic leads to the danger that unfet-
tered FDI may create a time profile of foreign exchange outflows (in the form of
dividend payments or profits repatriation) and inflows (for example, fresh FDI) which
may be time inconsistent. Experience shows that such incompatibility, even in the
short run may easily produce a liquidity crisis. The evidence from the Asian liquidity
crisis suggests that it could degenerate into a solvency crisis with serious adverse
consequences for economic development [Kregel, 1996; Singh, 2001].
These considerations suggest that to avoid financial fragility the government
would need to monitor and regulate the amount and timing of FDI. Since the nature
of large FDI projects (whether or not for example these would produce exportable
products, or how large their imports would be) can also significantly affect the time
profile of aggregate foreign exchange inflows and outflows, both in the short and long
term, the government may also need to regulate such investments. To the extent
that the PMAI would not permit this kind of regulation of FDI, it would subject
developing economies to much greater financial fragility.
It could in principle be argued that even if the financial fragility point is con-
ceded, a PMAI may still benefit developing countries by generating greater overall
FDI, which could compensate for the increased financial fragility. The validity of this
proposition, however, is doubtful. We saw earlier that FDI has risen significantly in
the 1990s. This occurred without any MAI and was clearly a product of a number of
other factors.18 Similarly, regulatory constraints on FDI and the total amount of FDI
that a country is able to attract do not appear to be related. Malaysia [U.S., 1996]
and China, [Braunstein and Epstein, 1999], for example, are large recipients of FDI
despite having significant control and regulation over FDI projects.
FDI AND REAL ECONOMY, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, SPILLOVERS,
INVESTMENT AND SAVINGS
Apart from FDI as a source of finance, two of the most important ways in which
a developing country may benefit from such investments is (a) through transfer of
technology and (b) from spillovers. The latter refer to the effects of FDI on raising
productivity in local firms. These firms may be helped by foreign investment in a
variety of ways, including the demonstration effect of the new technology and the
enhancement of the quality of inputs which such investment may promote. On the
other hand there may be few positive or even negative spillovers, if FDI forces local
firms out of the market because of greater competition.
Both issues of technology transfer and spillovers have been widely studied, re-
sulting in a large and controversial literature. The main lesson it provides in relation
to the question of technology transfer is that a country is more likely to benefit from
multinational investment if FDI is integrated into its national development and tech-
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This is why, other than Hong Kong, most successful Asian countries (including China
and Malaysia as seen above) have extensively regulated FDI.
On the issue of spillovers, early studies were quite optimistic about the positive
externalities from FDI on domestic industries. However, these studies suffered from
severe methodological difficulties particularly in relation to the question of causa-
tion. More recent research using more up-to-date methodology as well as large
microeconomic data sets arrives at much more pessimistic conclusions. In an influen-
tial study, Aitken and Harrison [1999] found that in Venezuela multinational invest-
ment had a negative effect on productivity of domestic plants in the industry. Such
results are quite common from micro-level data [Hanson, 2001]. Similarly, the World
Bank reaches the following conclusion from its comprehensive survey of the empiri-
cal studies of the effects of FDI on productivity growth in developing countries:
The productivity benefits of capital flows—through the transfer of
technology and management techniques and the stimulation of fi-
nancial sector development—are significant in countries where a de-
veloped physical infrastructure, a strong business environment, and
open trade regimes have facilitated the absorption of those flows, but
not otherwise. (Italics added). [2001, 59]
A critical issue in evaluating the effects of FDI on the real economy is its impact
on domestic savings and investments. Economic theory does not yield any unambigu-
ous predictions about how domestic investment may be affected by foreign capital
inflows. In general, this depends on the level of development of the economy, its
degree of integration with international economy and its absorptive capacity. Table 4
shows the results of World Bank’s analysis of the impact of various types of capital
flows on investments and savings for a large cross-section of developing countries
from 1972 to 1998. The results show that although FDI is positively associated with
the investment, there is little relationship with savings. The long-term bank lending
has a more important influence on investment than does FDI. Portfolio investment
is, on the other hand, associated more with savings than with investments.
A more interesting analysis of this issue is reported in the recent study by Agosin
and Mayer [2000]. This study examines the regional variations in the effects of FDI
on the crowding in and out of domestic investment. The two authors’ research cov-
ered 1970 to 1996 and included host countries from all three developing regions—
Africa, Asia and Latin America. The results of the econometric exercise suggest that
over this long period there was strong crowding in in Asia, crowding out in Latin
America and more or less neutral effects in Africa. Agosin and Mayer conclude:
…the most far-reaching liberalizations of FDI regimes in the 1990s
took place in Latin America, and that FDI regimes in Asia have re-
mained the least liberal in the developing world… Nonetheless, it is
in these countries that there is strongest evidence of CI (crowding
in). In Latin America, on the other hand,…liberalization does not
appear to have led to CI. [ibid., 14]212 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
Turning finally, but for reasons of space, extremely briefly, to the relationship
between FDI and long-term economic growth, Lipsey’s comprehensive survey suc-
cinctly sums up the evidence on this issue as follows:
… As with the studies of wage and productivity spillovers,
those of the effects of FDI inflows on economic growth are inconclu-
sive. Almost all find positive effects in some periods, or among some
group of countries, in some specifications, but one cannot say from
these studies that there are universal effects. There are periods, in-
dustries, and countries where FDI seems to have little relation to
growth, especially when other factors, mostly related to FDI also are
included as explanations. [2001, 56-57]
What can be concluded for PMAI from the above analysis of various aspects of
FDI? The main implication would appear to be that a global regime of unfettered FDI
would not be Pareto-optimal for all developing nations. Countries have different (a)
levels of economic development, (b) previous history, (c) endowments, (d) path trajec-
tories, and (e) public and private sector capabilities of making effective use of FDI.
Some may benefit from unrestricted FDI inflows and may have the absorptive capac-
ity to cope with FDI surges and famines. Others may benefit more from its purposive
regulation to avoid coordination or other market failures arising from unfettered
FDI, as outlined above. A regime of unrestricted capital flows as envisaged in PMAI
would deprive countries of policy autonomy in this sphere. In some cases, for ex-
ample countries with ineffective or weak governments, this may not matter. How-
ever, in other countries regulation of FDI would bring net benefit because the correc-
tion of market failures would easily outweigh government failures. The so-called ‘“de-
velopmental states” in Asia have been obvious examples of this. The PMAI would not
serve the developmental needs of these countries. The main message of this paper is,
therefore, that in the real world of second best, a case by case approach and selectiv-
ity is called for rather than a one-size-fits-all universal rules of the kind contained in
PMAI.
CONCLUSION
The first part of the paper examined the theoretical and empirical case for short-
term capital account liberalization in developing countries and found it wanting. In-
deed, as Stiglitz suggests, there is arguably a compelling case against it. The second
part considered the question of long-term capital account liberalization, specifically,
that of FDI. Most economists, including Stiglitz, favor such capital flows into devel-
oping countries. On closer analysis, however, it is argued here than even FDI, if
unregulated, may do more harm than good to many countries. It is therefore sug-
gested that developing countries should resist the new multilateral agreement on
investment, which Japan and the EU are proposing at the WTO, even though it will
cover only FDI.213 CAPITAL ACCOUNT LIBERALIZATION
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ments greatly helped to improve the paper. This work was carried out at the Centre for Business
Research at Cambridge University. The Centre’s contributions are gratefully acknowledged. The
usual caveat applies.
1. For a comprehensive survey and a recent contribution, see for example Feldstein [2002].
2. This section of the paper draws on Chakravarty and Singh [1988].
3. Such a mechanism, for example, existed in the “Golden Age” of the post-WWII era (1950-1973) when,
under the aegis of a single hegemonic economic power, namely the U.S., European economies were
able to maintain high levels of aggregate demand to ensure full employment [Glyn et al., 1990; Singh,
1995a].
4. See further Freeman [1989]; Singh [1995b]; Amsden [2001].
5. The US was willing to open its own markets to East Asian manufacturers without insisting on recip-
rocal opening of East Asian market. See further, Glyn et al., [1990].
6. See Passinetti [1981] for a fuller discussion of the learning approach to this issue.
7. On this set of issues, see for example, Stiglitz [1994]; Allen and Gale [2000]; Glen, Lee and Singh
[2000].
8. A referee has objected that since Kaminsky and Reinhart [1999] and Demigüc-Kunt and Detragiache
[1998] include both developing countries and advanced countries, it is not legitimate to draw conclu-
sions about developing countries alone from this evidence. However, as argued in the text below,
developing countries are more prone to financial crises following liberalization than Acs. Considering
the two group of countries together will underestimate the strength of the relationship between
financial liberalization, banking and currency crisis and underdevelopment rather than to overstate
it.
9. For fuller discussion of these issues see Singh [2002a]; Jomo [2001]; Singh and Weisse [1999] and
Rodrik [2000].
10. IMF [2002, Box 3.4, 126], broadly supports these conclusions.
11. A referee has pointed out that there is a greater difference in volatility between advanced countries
and developing countries in terms of trade compared with capital flows. However, changes in terms
of trade may be caused either by capital flows or current account balance, or both, as well as other
factors. This important issue will not be pursued here.
12. Similar results are reported in IMF [2002].
13. For a fuller discussion of the issues involved in this argument see Cosh, Hughes and Singh [1990] and
Singh [2000].
14. This and the following sections are based on Singh [2001].
15. See Singh and Zammit [1998] for a further discussion.
16. This is the empirical definition of FDI adopted by many countries to distinguish it from portfolio
flows.
17. A referee has pointed out that the problems of FDI volatility create difficulties not just for developing
countries but also for the U.S. where there has been a substantial drop in FDI recently.
18. See Singh [1997a; 1997b]; Singh and Weisse [1998] for a further discussion.
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